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Social transfer program s in developing countries are designed to 
contribute to  poverty reduction by increasing th e  income of the 
poor in order to  ensure m inimal living standards. In addition, 
social transfers provide a safety net for the  vulnerable, w ho are 
typically no t covered by contributory social security. The question 
of how  effective such program s are in achieving these aims has 
been th e  subject of num erous impact evaluations. However, the 
optimal design of such programs is still unclear. Even less is known 
about w hether th e  adoption and implementation of transfer pro­
grams is really driven by poverty and neediness or w hether other 
factors also have an  in f luence. To investigate these and other 
research questions, w e have developed a new  dataset entitled 
Non-Contributory Social Transfer Programs (NSTP) in Developing 
Countries. One advantage of this dataset is that it traces 186 non­
contributory programs from 101 countries back in tim e and pre­
sents them  in panel form for the  period up until 2015. The second 
advantage is that it contains all the  details regarding th e  various 
programs'  designs as well as information on costs and coverage in 
a coded format and thus facilitates both comparative quantitative 
and in-depth qualitative analyses. W hile describing the  data we 
discuss a  num ber of examples of how  the  dataset can be used to 
explore different issues related to social policies in developing
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countries. We present suggestive evidence that the  adoption of 
social transfer program s is not based only on pro-poor motives, but 
rather that social policy choices differ betw een political regimes.
& 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an  open 
access article under th e  CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. In troduction
Social protection programs can be an important instrument in f ighting poverty and protecting the 
vulnerable. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the number of anti-poverty transfer programs in 
developing countries has increased signif icantly. At the same time, the design and eff iciency of such 
programs remains subject to debate. The major areas of dispute involve the trade-off between current 
and future poverty alleviation; the selection and social exclusion problems involved in designing 
social protection programs; and these programs'  regularity, duration, and budget size. Numerous 
studies have explored the eff iciency and effectiveness of such programs in different country contexts. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, there is little work that takes a global perspective on social 
transfer programs in the developing world. This paper introduces a new dataset that provides such a 
comprehensive overview of social transfer programs in developing countries.
Many scholars stress the gap in comparable data on social assistance for non-OECD countries 
[1- 3]. The existing sources usually comprise data on one type of social policy or are focused mostly on 
one region or only on developed countries. Typically, the time span is not large and the information is 
available only for the most recent 10 to 15 years. One exception is the database by Barrientos et al. [4], 
which combines the data on social assistance for developing countries; however, it presents only the 
descriptive prof i les of social assistance programs, which cannot be easily used in a comparative 
analysis and only provide coverage up until 2010. Our Non-Contributory Social Transfer Programs 
(NSTP) Dataset1 signif icantly extends the work by Barrientos et al. [4] in terms ofboth time and space. 
We have checked the existing information on social transfer programs and included 102 additional 
programs. In total, our database comprises 186 program prof i les in 101 countries. What is more 
important is that we encode all the details and characteristics of social transfer programs in panel 
form so that the data can be used for any type of quantitative and qualitative analysis. We list ele­
ments of the design such as the type of transfer, type of conditions, targeting mechanism, delivery 
mode, donor involvement, and pilot status, as well as cost and coverage numbers where this infor­
mation is available. This type of table format for the data allows for a closer look at social policies in 
the developing countries from a global perspective. It thus facilitates comparative analyses according 
to numerous characteristics of the programs. Our database is intended to be an innovative tool to 
study worldwide trends in social assistance, evaluate the performance of individual schemes, and 
identify effective and eff icient features of social transfer programs.
On the one hand, the NSTP dataset can be used to examine all transfer programs in panel form in a 
cross-country quantitative study. On the other hand, it allows for a focus on specif ic program char­
acteristics such as different types of transfers, conditions, or targeting mechanisms. Such character­
istics can easily be compared across regions or countries. The dataset provides information on every 
program prof i le, which can be used for a quick search of the details of any program in operation. Thus, 
it can be used by qualitative scholars to identify those programs with specif ic characteristics for 
further in-depth study.
After describing the data, we brief ly review the main strands of the literature on the effectiveness/ 
eff iciency of social policy and suggest how the NSTP dataset may be used to explore open questions. 
To provide a more specif ic example that demonstrates the possible applications of the data, we focus 
on a particular research question: To what extent is the expansion of social transfer programs in the 
developing world driven by factors that are not related to pro-poor motives? We consider the political
Data is freely available in the GESIS Data Archive. http://dx.doi.org/10.7802/1530
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basis for the adoption of social transfer programs using proxies from the Polity IV dataset [5].W e f ind 
that democracies have more social transfer programs on average. Also, democratic regimes more 
often adopt conditional cash transfers (CCTs). In contrast, unconditional family support programs are 
signif icantly more widespread in non-democratic regimes, and public works programs are slightly 
more common. Moreover, we f ind that non-democratic regimes employ more targeting methods that 
are prone to strategic misuse and lead to less objectivity in the allocation of benef its. These regimes 
appear to demonstrate more political than pro-poor targeting.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the structure and sources of the new 
dataset. Section 3 points out possible lines of research and proposes some insights from the literature 
that might be examined using the new data. Section 4 presents preliminary statistics on the link 
between political regimes and particular program characteristics.
2. Data
The Non-Contributory Social Transfer Programs (NSTP) in Developing Countries Dataset aims to 
provide a comprehensive overview of progressive and institutionalised social transfer programs that 
are intended to mitigate poverty and, often, to incentivise households to invest in long-term devel­
opment to escape from poverty. The programs in the database are public, non-contributory, and 
rolled out on a large scale at the national level. In order to capture the redistribution efforts of 
governments, we include only public programs and exclude private initiatives carried out by NGOs or 
religious entities. The focus on non-contributory programs ensures that we capture progressive 
redistribution. In order to be truly pro-poor, social transfer schemes need to be available to informal 
sector workers and hence not be tied to formal employment. We further focus on large initiatives that 
have the potential to have a signif icant impact on poverty at the national level. Pilot programs that are 
likely to be scaled-up to the national level have also been included. Thus, our database lists programs 
that make regular transfers and that help the poor to meet their day-to-day consumption needs. We 
exclude one-time programs for catastrophe relief, and we purposefully do not include information on 
contributory social insurance systems as they typically only benef it  a small and privileged segment of 
society (or employees) in developing countries. On similar grounds we also do not include programs 
that are solely available to a small group of the most destitute such as the disabled, widows, orphans, 
specif ic occupational groups, or ethnicities. We exclude such narrowly targeted programs because 
they hardly have a poverty mitigation effect at the national level.2 Although we include information 
on the number of benef iciaries, transfer size, and cost of programs where it is available, the lack of 
comparable data does not allow us to have more formal inclusion and exclusion criteria (such as cut­
off points that refer to the size of the programs). As we do not provide information on all elements of 
social security systems in developing countries, our database should not be used to assess all the 
contributory and non-contributory components of countries' social policy.
As already mentioned, the existing datasets do not cover all the available information on non­
contributory social schemes in non-OECD countries [1- 3]. In addition, they present information only 
for recent years. For example, the ILO Social Security Inquiry Database [6] lists all the components of 
the social security system for 97 developed and developing countries. However, it comprises infor­
mation on these varied social protection initiatives only for the period from 2000 to 2012. Another 
solid database is the World Bank Atlas of Social Protection -  Indicators of Resilience and Equity 
(ASPIRE) [7]. It presents aggregated indicators of social protection systems'  performance and 
expenditure for 117 developing countries from 1998 to 2014. The information, however, is available 
only for program categories, not for individual schemes. The United Nations Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) provides a database on non-contributory social pro­
tection programs in 22 countries within one region only: Latin America and the Caribbean [8].
2  An exception to this rule is orphan care programs in countries with a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS where there is a large 
number of orphans. Information on pensions for the disabled and widows is included where the former are a part of general 
non-contributory old-age pensions.
54 M. Dodlova et al. /  Data in Brief 16 (2018) 51- 64
Fig. 1. Social Transfer Programs Worldwide in 2015. Note: Countries with at least one transfer program are coloured dark blue 
(101 countries in total or 70 per cent of all developing countries).
Table 1
Types of social transfer programs.
Unconditional 
family support
Social
pension
CCT Public
works
Unconditional 60 (32.26%)
family support
Social pension 4 (2.15%) 37 (19.89)
CCT 3 (1.61%) 2 (1.08%) 57 (30.65%)
Public works 3 (1.61%) 2 (1.08) 18 (9.68%)
Similarly, the Social Protection Index (SPI) of the Asian Development Bank compiles indices of 
aggregate social protection indicators for 42 countries in the Asian region for 2000 to 2010 [9]. 
Regarding non-contributory pension schemes, Pension Watch provides a large Social Pensions 
Database for 107 developed and developing countries [10]. The only comprehensive data on social 
assistance in developing countries is the data provided by Barrientos et al. [4]. However, they focus 
more on the program prof iles and case study analyses, thereby disregarding a potential quantitative 
comparative perspective. These different data sources feed into our database, where they are com­
plemented by further typically program-specif ic sources such as program evaluation reports and 
national social security boards. We have screened all of these and other sources to compile com­
parable information on non-contributory, large-scale and pro-poor transfers that can be used for both 
qualitative and quantitative analyses of all developing countries.
Our data collection effort extends the work by Barrientos et al. [4]. This earlier database included 
information on 110 social transfer programs in 55 countries up until 2010. We updated 84 of the 
earlier program prof iles and decided not to include 26 programs because they either had been dis­
continued or did not meet our aforementioned criteria for inclusion. In addition, we collected new 
information on 102 social transfer programs that were not reported by Barrientos et al. [4]. As a result, 
we present 186 program prof iles from 101 countries, covering the time up to 2015. We provide the 
data in two formats: a list and a table format. The list consists of descriptive program prof iles that 
provide information on program characteristics and include further links to relevant program impact 
evaluations in the literature. The table component of the database includes both country-year and 
program-period panels with encoded information on program design, costs, coverage, and other 
elements from the descriptive program f iles. Thus, the NSTP dataset is organised so as to facilitate 
both quantitative and qualitative research.
Fig. 1 presents all developing countries that had at least one social transfer program in 2015 in 
dark blue. This corresponds to 101 countries in total or 70 per cent of developing countries. All
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Table 2
Frequency of targeting methods in 2015.
Categorical Geographical Means test Proxy means test Community-based Self-targeting
Categorical 39 (20.97%)
Geographical 15 (8.06%)
Means test 28 (15.05%) 13 (6.99%)
Proxy means test 14 (7.53%) 3 (1.61%) 13 (6.99%)
Community-based 8 (4.3%) 6 (3.23%) 3 (1.61%) 3 (1.61%) 5 (2.69%)
Self-targeting 2 (1.08%) 7 (3.76%) 4 (2.15%)
Note: In total Table 2 includes 163 (88%) programs, whereas the remaining 23 (12%) programs use a combination of three or 
more targeting mechanisms. In total, 124 programs (66%) use categorical targeting, 54 (29%) use geographical targeting, 48 
(26%) use means tests, 48 (26%) use proxy means tests, 35 (19%) use community-based targeting, and 15 (8%) are self-targeted.
developing countries that do not have a program are coloured light blue, while all developed 
countries are left white. We can see that while almost all countries in Latin America, Europe, and 
Central Asia have at least one transfer program, there are clusters of countries in Africa and the 
Middle East that do not have any transfer programs.
The share of countries per region with a program are as follows: 91 per cent in Europe and Central 
Asia, 90 per cent in Latin America and the Caribbean, 80 per cent in East Asia and the Pacif ic,3 75 per 
cent in South Asia, 66 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa, and 54 per cent in the Middle East and North 
Africa.
Of the countries in our dataset, 55 have more than one social transfer program. Bangladesh, with 
eight programs, has the highest number of individual schemes in operation. However, having a larger 
number of transfer programs in operation does not necessarily imply broader coverage or greater 
spending on social assistance. In what follows, we describe the main features of the design of social 
transfer programs and present the variables that we code on the basis of these features. In particular, 
we discuss the typology of transfers and conditions, the targeting mechanisms used for benef iciary 
selection, and cost and coverage details. We also review the modes of delivery, donor involvement, 
and the status of programs (pilot or not). Other program details and characteristics, such as transfer 
volume or detailed eligibility criteria, which are not easily comparable across countries, are presented 
only in the descriptive part of the database. We refer those scholars who wish to use this information 
to the qualitative program prof iles.
2.1. Typology of transfers and conditions
We distinguish between unconditional and conditional transfers. The important difference is that 
the recipient of unconditional transfers does not have to comply with any conditions to receive the 
transfer apart from meeting the targeting criteria. The benef iciary of conditional transfers has to make 
some kind of effort to receive the transfer, meaning that he or she usually has to comply with certain 
rules or types of behaviour. Of the 186 programs in the dataset, 101 are unconditional, 78 are con­
ditional, and 7 combine elements of both conditional and unconditional schemes.
We further categorise transfers into unconditional family support schemes, social pension 
schemes, CCTs, and public works programs. Under unconditional family support schemes, we sub­
sume transfers targeted to low-income households or specif ically to children that are not tied to 
school attendance or regular health check-ups. They range from a basic safety net for those below the 
poverty line to (universal) child support grants. We def ine social pension schemes as transfers to the 
elderly that are independent of a history of contributions by the benef iciary or his/her employer. CCTs 
are programs that link the receipt of a transfer to investments in education and/or health. Health 
conditions usually aim to improve child and/or maternal health. Panama, however, has an old-age 
pension scheme that is paid conditional on regular health check-ups. Education conditions pre­
dominantly aim at improving the school enrolment and achievements of children from low-income
This share is calculated excluding small island states.
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households. Some CCTs specif ically target girls or young adults. We provide information on whether 
the receipt of the benef it is conditional upon household investments in health, education, or both. 
Public works programs give out transfers in exchange for work at public employment sites. “Below 
market”  or minimum wages are supposed to ensure that only the needy self-select into these pro­
grams. Table 1 shows all possible combinations of transfer types with percentages in brackets. The 
dataset includes information on 70 unconditional family support programs, 64 CCTs, 43 social pen­
sions, and 23 public works programs. Of these programs, 14 are combinations of two types. For 
example, the Social Cash Transfer Program in Malawi provides unconditional cash transfers to 
households living in poverty and an additional benef it  for each child attending school. It is hence 
coded as both an unconditional family support scheme and as a CCT. Of all the CCTs, 23 require an 
education investment and 8 a health investment; 33 are conditional upon investments in both 
education and health.
2.2. Targeting
Another characteristic of social transfer programs is the targeting mechanism used to determine 
eligibility for a program. We follow the classif ications by Barrientos [11] and Coady et al. [12] and
distinguish between six types of targeting -  namely, categorical, geographical, means tests, proxy 
means tests, community-based targeting, and self-targeting.
The simplest mechanism is categorical targeting based on categories def ined ex ante. Benef its are 
given conditional on belonging to a certain age group, gender, or social category -  for example, the 
elderly, children, women-headed households, etc. If categorical targeting is employed without any 
additional targeting mechanism, the transfers are in effect universal instead of poverty targeted.
A special form of categorical targeting is based on geographical location. In particular, the transfers 
are allocated to the regions identif ied as the poorest within a country using one or several indicators 
associated with a high level of poverty -  for example, literacy rates, nutritional status, or consumption 
measures. Eligibility for a program is dependent on residence in these areas. While we do not include 
the transfer programs of federal states (or other decentralised governing units), we do include pro­
grams that are allocated to districts or regions def ined as the poorest by the central government.
Means testing refers to a form of targeting that involves the assessment of the income of a 
household or individual by an off icial. If the income falls below some cut-off level, the individual or 
household becomes eligible for program benef its. Ideally, this implies the existence of documentable 
and verif iable information on income in the form of tax records, wage information from employers, or 
f inancial information from banks. However, in contexts of weak administrative capacity and/or a high 
share of informal labour, documenting and verifying income is not straightforward. Hence, there are 
large differences in the complexity and accuracy of means tests. In some cases, an off icer assesses the 
income of a potential benef iciary in their home; in other cases the applicant is interviewed in an off ice 
with the information taken at face value.
Proxy means tests are similar to means tests, but instead of using information on income, they use 
information on observable household characteristics that are strongly correlated with poverty to 
calculate a score for the households'  economic situation. The information typically collected for proxy 
means tests in poor countries includes the quality of the dwelling, the ownership of durable goods, 
household composition, education level, and occupational sector. The score is then used to determine 
eligibility for benef its.
In community-based targeting, a group of community members or a community leader decides on 
eligibility for a program. This targeting method takes advantage of social capital -  that is, the fact that 
local actors have more information available or at a lower cost than program off icials.
Self-targeted programs are in principle open to all but use strong incentives to discourage use by 
the non-poor. Public works programs that use self-targeting based on a work requirement typically 
pay wages that are below the market wage for unskilled labour or the minimum wage. The low wages 
ensure that only the really needy self-select into the program. However, when the number of 
applicants exceeds the number of jobs in the program, additional targeting or selection methods need 
to be implemented (e.g. means tests or proxy means tests). In the latter case, the program is no longer 
self-selected.
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Fig. 2. Number of social transfer programs in LAC, 1990- 2015.
Many of the programs in our sample use more than one targeting method. In fact, only 40 per cent 
of all programs employ a single targeting method. We therefore def ine a binary indicator for every 
targeting mechanism. Table 1 shows the frequency of targeting choices across all programs in 2015 
with the percentages in brackets. In addition to the combinations displayed, approximately 12 per 
cent of all programs apply a combination of three or more targeting methods. The most frequent 
choices of targeting methods are categorical criteria only, a combination of categorical criteria with a 
means test, geographical criteria, or a proxy means test.
2.3. Cost and coverage
The most important characteristics of social assistance programs are their budget and coverage -  
that is, how expensive they are and how many benef iciaries they have. Along with effective and 
eff icient targeting, the budget and coverage of social programs are principal components that con­
tribute to structural changes in inequality and poverty levels. We report only the original source data 
and only if the year of the respective coverage or budget information is indicated by the source.
Depending on the program, coverage is measured in terms of individuals or households or both. 
We provide information on coverage of individuals for 110 social transfer programs and coverage of 
households for 55 programs.
We report program budget data according to two dimensions, depending on availability. The f irst 
dimension is the absolute value of program costs in either USD million or the local currency. If the 
program budget is presented in the local currency, we assume that these costs are in the current 
prices for the year as provided in the source. If the USD measure for the program budget is presented, 
we assume that local currency costs have been transformed into USD using the current exchange rate 
for the year of the source. The second dimension is the budget as a share of the country's GDP. The 
database includes information on the cost in USD million of 54 programs and on the cost as a per­
centage of GDP of 47 programs. Hence, our indicators of the cost and coverage of the programs are 
encoded according to the availability of data on the different measures.
2.4. Other elements of the programs' design
2.4.1. Delivery
The benef its provided by social transfer programs are predominantly distributed in cash. Of all the 
programs in our database, 155 (84 per cent) give out cash only. Cash in combination with other 
services such as trainings is provided by 21 programs (11 per cent). Public works programs are also 
counted as being among these programs. Six programs (3 per cent) give out cash in combination with 
food. Only four programs (2 per cent) are pure food transfers.
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Fig. 3. Share of developing democracies and non-democracies with a transfer program, 1990- 2014. Note: The data on the polity 
score extends until 2014.
2.4.2. Donors
Since the 1990s the expansion of social transfer programs has been actively promoted by inter­
national donors [13]. In 2015 at least one donor was involved in more than 26 per cent of programs. 
The donors contribute to both program funding and program design and implementation. The most 
inf luential donor is the World Bank, which supports 30 programs, followed by UNICEF (11 programs), 
DFID UK4 (11 programs), and the World Food Program (5 programs).
2.4.3. Pilots
The database captures information on nine social transfer programs that were being piloted in 
2015. We have also coded the years in which now-large-scale programs were pilots.
3. Research agenda
In the following, we brief ly review some of the main strands of the literature on the effectiveness 
and eff iciency of social policy in developing countries, highlighting gaps that could be addressed 
using the NSTP data. We then provide examples of how the data can be used to examine the political 
motivations behind the adoption of transfer programs.
3.1. 3.1 Effectiveness and efficiency
Fig. 2 illustrates the increase in the adoption of transfer programs in the Latin American and 
Caribbean (LAC) region. While there were six social transfer programs in 1990, the number had risen 
to 47 in 2010 and 55 in 2015. Other regions demonstrate similar patterns. This makes it evident that 
social policy diffusion plays a major role in poverty reduction [3,14]. However, research in this area is 
still scarce and little is known about policy simulation patterns in developing countries.
Scholarly interest in transfer programs has risen accordingly in recent decades, resulting in a lit­
erature that is quite broad and interdisciplinary. One strand centres on questions related to the 
conceptualisation, design, and implementation of social policy. The scholars consider the methodo­
logical and theoretical aspects, with the debates focused particularly on selection and social exclusion 
problems, the types of transfers, program scale, and other technicalities [11,15,16]. The classical 
questions relate to the eff iciency and effectiveness of unconditional versus conditional transfers, the 
different targeting methods, and graduation out of transfer schemes. There is strong evidence in the
Department for International Development -  United Kingdom.
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Fig. 4. Transfer program types in democracies and non-democracies, 1990- 2014. Note: The data on the polity score extends 
until 2014.
empirical literature that both unconditional and conditional transfers have a poverty-reduction effect. 
However, the debates on specif ic design elements of the programs that contribute most to poverty 
alleviation are ongoing [17]. Regarding the effect of cash transfers on school attendance, there seems 
to be agreement that CCTs with explicit education conditions and penalties for non-compliance have 
a stronger effect than unconditional transfers [18,19]. Studies that focus on CCTs provide evidence of 
increased health service use and improved health outcomes [20,21]. And recent studies that compare 
conditional and unconditional transfers suggest that health conditions do indeed matter [22,23].
A few studies have recently reviewed the targeting effectiveness of social transfer programs. Coady 
et al. [12] f ind that no single targeting mechanism performs best in all contexts. Devereux at al. [24] 
conf irm that all the targeting mechanisms generate inclusion/exclusion errors and costs and they also 
conclude that the appropriate choice of targeting mechanism is context-specif ic. At the same time, 
Devereux et al. [25] present evidence that community-based programs might be quite eff icient and 
proxy-means tests are better in certain cases than categorical indicators. There are also debates on the 
technical part of targeting. For example, Coady and Skouf ias [26] suggest an alternative approach to 
evaluate targeting mechanisms by decomposing their effects into two, targeting eff iciency of the 
instrument and redistributive eff iciency. Azevedo and Robles [27] conclude that a multidimensional 
targeting approach should be applied in order to increase the eff iciency of conditional cash transfers. 
The NSTP data allows conducting further research on the comparison and effectiveness of targeting 
methods.
Not surprisingly due to the complexity of the relationships, the evidence is weakest for a positive 
effect of social transfer programs on social inclusion and economic growth [28]. The NSTP data could, 
for example, be used to analyse the link between (certain types or design characteristics of) social 
transfer programs and human development outcomes. In addition, the NSTP data can contribute to 
measuring income and redistribution; especially in the regions with poor national statistics (see for a 
discussion [29]). Women's empowerment is another research topic, for which the NSTP dataset can 
provide interesting statistics for cross-country perspective. Duf lo [30] reviews that women's 
empowerment is closely linked to human capital accumulation and self-sustainable development.
Regarding the affordability of social assistance, one strand of literature stresses a moral argument 
for assisting the poor and reducing risk by providing a minimum safety net [31- 33]. Another line of 
research focuses on modelling the cost of basic social protection [34,35]. The third perspective on 
affordability concerns the sources of f inance [36,37]. This debate also centres on whether and how 
people working in the informal sector can be made to contribute f inancially to social protection 
[38,39]. Further questions include the political acceptance of certain types of assistance [20,40] and 
the labour market effects of extensions to social security [41,42]. An interesting application of the
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NSTP data could therefore be to examine the effects of the adoption of (specif ic types of) social 
transfer programs on labour supply or the productive capacity of the poor.
3.2. The politics of pro-poor policies
Another important part of the literature is the research on the politics of social assistance. In this 
emerging subf ield the main questions involve how social transfer programs promoted by interna­
tional donors contribute to building state capacity and how the design and implementation of such 
programs are eroded by corruption, clientelism, and other political motives. Indeed, a number of 
interesting insights emerge from the analysis of the motivations for adopting social transfer programs 
in developing countries. The recent studies show that social transfer programs are not chosen pri­
marily because of poverty reduction but are also driven by other mechanisms not related to pro-poor 
motives [40,43,44]. In particular, political leaders may use social policy in order to strengthen their 
rule. In democratic regimes, social benef its can be a tool to gain or reward voters [45- 48]. Autocracies 
may use transfers to mitigate social unrest by increasing the standard of living of the poor or they 
may channel benef its to their supporters [49- 51]. There is an emerging literature on how social 
transfers decrease non-electoral forms of political participation such as protests and demonstration 
attendance [52]. In addition, leaders in both regime types may enact social policies as a response to 
pressure from international donors or neighbouring countries [14,53- 55].
In what follows, we use the NSTP dataset to provide suggestive evidence on the political economy 
of social transfer programs. We consider whether political motives or institutions affect the design of 
transfer programs. Political regimes particularly inf luence the scope and structure of social policy. 
Hence, we focus on additional factors not related to purely pro-poor motives that shape social policy 
in developing countries. First, we explore the prevalence of transfer programs in democracies versus 
non-democracies. Fig. 3 shows the percentage of developing democracies and non-democracies5 that 
had at least one transfer program between 1990 and 2014 in five-year intervals. Of all the developing 
countries, 12 per cent of democracies and 12 per cent of non-democracies had a transfer program in 
1990. We see that starting in the mid-1990s, the share of countries with at least one social transfer 
program increased steadily in all regime types, though signif icantly more in the case of democracies. 
In 2014, 75 per cent of countries classif ied as democracies and only 60 per cent of countries classif ied 
as non-democracies had at least one transfer program.
Of the 162 programs for which we have information on the polity type in the year of adoption of a 
program, 81 (50 per cent) were adopted by democratic countries, 58 (36 per cent) were adopted by 
anocracies, and 23 (14 per cent) by autocracies.
Second, we explore systematic differences in the types of transfer programs according to regime 
type. Fig. 4 shows the increase in the number of unconditional and conditional transfer programs 
between 1990 and 2014 in democracies and non-democracies in five-year intervals. We see that 
starting from the mid-1990s, the number of both types of programs increased steadily in both regime 
types. In total, more transfer programs were adopted in democracies, with the total number in 2014 
being roughly twice the number of programs in non-democracies (128 versus 62).6 Moreover, in 
democracies more conditional programs were adopted than in non-democracies. In 2014, democracies 
had 60 (47 per cent) conditional programs and 68 (53 per cent) unconditional programs, while non­
democracies had 23 (37 per cent) conditional programs and 39 (63 per cent) unconditional ones. 
Regarding the subcategories of programs in 2014, democracies had 40 unconditional family support 
programs (30 per cent), 30 pension schemes (23 per cent), 47 CCTs (36 per cent), and 14 public works 
programs (11 per cent). Non-democracies had 28 unconditional family support programs (45 per cent), 
11 pension schemes (19 per cent), 14 CCTs (22 per cent), and 8 public works programs (13 per cent).
5  We use the polity score from the Polity IV Project [5] to distinguish between polity types. The polity score classi f i  es 
countries on a scale of -10 to 10. Countries with a score above 5 are classif ied as democracies, countries with a polity score 
between -5 and 5 are classif ied as anocracies, and countries with a polity score below -5 are classif ied as autocracies. Infor­
mation on the polity score only extends until 2014.
6  The f i  gure includes the seven programs that are coded as both conditional and unconditional. Hence, the numbers given 
here exceed the total number of 182 programs in 2014.
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Fig. 5. Targeting mechanisms by regime type in 2014. Note:  The data on the polity score extends until 2014.
There thus appears to be a correlation between a higher score on the polity scale and having a 
social transfer program. This is in line with the literature on the link between regime type and 
redistribution, according to which democratic countries are more likely to have social transfer pro­
grams [43,56]. Moreover, we see that democracies apply more programs with human capital 
investments. This is very probably connected to the fact that democracies care more about the long­
term developmental effects of pro-poor policies [57]. We can assume that non-democracies are 
interested in more unconditional transfer programs because the latter provide faster short-term 
effects, which help regimes to sustain power and decrease civil unrest in a society.
Finally, we are interested in the choice of targeting mechanisms, and specif ically their potential to 
be used for political reasons in different regime types. It appears that programs with a certain type of 
targeting are promoted more in non-democracies because they may be more easily manipulated in 
the interest of local elites or politicians. Fig. 5 shows the share of each targeting method by regime 
type in 2014. We see that geographical targeting is used by 19 per cent of programs in non­
democracies and 15 per cent in democracies. Community-based targeting is also more prominent in 
non-democracies: 19 per cent of programs there use this method versus 8 per cent of programs in 
democracies. Proxy means tests are used more frequently in democracies, where they have a share of 
15 per cent as opposed to a share of 9 per cent in non-democracies. Categorical targeting is also 
applied more in democracies, with this method used by 41 per cent of programs versus 32 per cent in 
non-democracies. Means tests and self-targeting are equally present in both regime types and 
represent approximately 15 and 5 per cent of all programs, respectively. These shares indicate sys­
tematic differences in the choice of targeting mechanisms between regime types.
As already mentioned, two targeting mechanisms are particularly dominant in non-democracies: 
community-based targeting and geographical targeting. When benef iciary selection is undertaken by 
a third party, it can be expected that this third party will act according to motives that are not in line 
with providing the most accurate pro-poor targeting. As a result, a possible explanation for why 
community-based programs are applied more often in non-democracies is that they leave room for 
subjective or politically motivated decisions in the allocation of benef its [58]. Local leaders/elites have 
a greater degree of discretion and their subjective considerations may impact the selection of ben­
ef iciaries into a program. The rent-seeking and clientelistic motives of community leaders may distort 
the eff iciency of such targeting in non-democracies, while also making this type of targeting more 
attractive. Moreover, this form of targeting can perpetuate local power structures, and certain 
minorities can be systematically excluded. Geographical targeting is likely to be dominant in non­
democracies because the incumbent leaders/parties can use it to reward loyal districts or, on the 
contrary, avoid social unrest in certain districts (strongholds versus swing voters). Especially in 
combination with other targeting mechanisms, geographical targeting may become more political 
than pro-poor. From our perspective, other interesting applications of the NSTP data could include
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analyses of the diffusion of (certain types of) social transfer programs across regions or the rela­
tionship between transfer programs and state capacity.
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